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I. INTRODUCTION
The war is over and Delaware has won. The "Delawariza-
tion" of bankruptcy law appears complete. The reorganization of a
large, publicly held corporation under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code today will more likely take place in the Delaware
* Professor of Law, Director, Joe C. Davis Program in Law and Economics, Vanderbilt
Law School
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. We would like to thank Lynn LoPucki for his
comments on an earlier draft of this piece, and for generously sharing his bankruptcy database
with us. We prepared this reply based solely on Professor LoPucki and Sara Kaln's initial piece.
We agreed at the start with Professor LoPucki that we would not modify this piece to attempt to
reply to any argument raised in his response.
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Bankruptcy Court than in any other jurisdiction.' The bankruptcy
judges and lawyers in Delaware are no doubt pleased with this
state of affairs, while many of their counterparts in other jurisdic-
tions look to Delaware with envy.2 While few question that Dela-
ware is the preferred forum for public corporations seeking to reor-
ganize, it remains hotly contested whether that is a good thing. In
other words, the race is to Delaware; but is it to the top, the bottom,
or somewhere in between?
To answer this normative question, one needs a theory ex-
plaining why the managers of a firm, advised by their lawyers, de-
cide to file in one jurisdiction as opposed to another. Some have ar-
gued that firms prefer to file in Delaware because the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court is the fastest and most efficient processor of
Chapter 11 cases. 3 Others see a nefarious attempt on the part of
managers of firms to shop for a forum that will promote their inter-
ests at the expense of shareholders and creditors.4 Still others view
the matter as more complex, suggesting that some of the reasons
for going to Delaware are beneficial from the perspective of social
welfare, while maintaining that other reasons are suspect.5 The
normative desirability of the stampede to Delaware remains a con-
tested issue.
Lynn LoPucki and Sara Kalin purport to provide the answer
in their article in this issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review. 6 Ac-
cording to them, Delaware's victory has been something of a mis-
take. Supposedly, those who took firms to Delaware to reorganize
simply did not know what they were getting themselves into. A firm
that reorganizes in Delaware, it turns out, is four times as likely to
file a second bankruptcy petition as is a firm that reorganizes in
another jurisdiction. "[T]he parties who stood to lose in a failed
Delaware reorganization simply underestimated the likelihood of
1. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 977-82 (1999);
Robert Y. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by
Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1367, 1372-76 (2000).
2. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1369 (detailing efforts by the Houston bank-
ruptcy judges to induce local attorneys to file in Houston rather than Delaware).
3. See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts
on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges]; David A. Skeol, Jr.,
Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243 (2000)
[hereinafter Skeel, Lockups].
4. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1001-03.
5. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1382-86.
6. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Dela-
ware and New York- Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001).
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failure."7 The conclusion that the players in the reorganization
game did not understand the risk inherent in choosing the Dela-
ware bankruptcy court leads directly to LoPucki and Kaln's policy
prescription-give the market more information. They endorse the
proposition that competition among bankruptcy courts can lead to
desirable results,8 and seek to promote competition by providing the
relevant actors with more information.
LoPucki and Kalin have increased our understanding of
bankruptcy practice in Delaware. Firms that reorganize there often
need a subsequent reorganization. We have no quarrel with their
factual findings. Naked facts, of course, do not generate conclu-
sions. What one needs is a theory that explains the facts. We main-
tai that LoPucki and Kalin's facts do not necessarily lead to the
conclusions that they draw, especially the conclusion that market
players are unable to assess legal regimes.9 This assertion, if true,
would have impact well beyond bankruptcy law and even corporate
law. The data that they generate, however, does not justify their
sweeping conclusions.
In this Reply, we proceed as follows. First, we set forth our
theory of venue choice in bankruptcy law, suggesting why competi-
tion among bankruptcy courts is likely to be efficient as to prepack-
aged bankruptcies, but may not be efficient as to traditional Chap-
ter 11 cases. 10 Given that there are theoretical reasons to distin-
guish between these two types of proceedings, we question LoPucki
and Kalin's failure to separate fully the data into one set consisting
solely of prepackaged bankruptcies and another set consisting
solely of traditional Chapter 11 proceedings. We then examine the
question, not studied in detail by LoPucki and Kalin, of what refil-
ing rates can tell us. In particular, LoPucki and Kalin have looked
at one type of capital restructuring after an initial reorganization-
a second bankruptcy-but have neglected to scrutinize the reasons
7. Id. at 236.
8. We also endorse competition among bankruptcy courts, so long as the decision of where
to file is made at a time when the interests of the firm's managers coincide with the goal of
maximizing firm value. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1400.01.
9. We recognize that market actors do need information to make sound decisions. Dela-
ware, however, has been the forum of choice for over five years. We believe that this period of
time, coupled with the relatively small nature of the reorganization bar-which allows for rapid
dissemination of reorganization practice-is sufficient to provide the parties with accurate in-
formation about the consequences of deciding to file in Delaware.
10. Competition in this setting does not necessarily require bankruptcy judges to alter their
behavior in order to attract cases. To be sure, they very well might. See Rasmussen & Thomas,
supra note 1, at 1400-01. Even if the prospect of attracting a large Chapter 11 case does not
affect judicial behavior, there is still competition in the sense that firms will select from available
jurisdictions the one they believe best suits their needs.
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why a large number of firms, well over half, dropped out of their
study. Their conclusion that market players do not understand the
effect of filing in Delaware depends upon "failure" being defined
exclusively as the initiation of a second bankruptcy proceeding.
Moreover, their focus on the costs of a second bankruptcy
proceeding fails to consider the possibility that there is an optimal,
non-zero amount of refilings. Embedded in their analysis is the as-
sumption that reorganization costs are the same across jurisdic-
tions. The fact that Delaware seems to handle its cases more
quickly than other jurisdictions provides a potential reason why it
may be rational to file for bankruptcy in Delaware, even if one as-
sumes that having to undergo a second bankruptcy proceeding is
costly.
Finally, we show that, even if refiling rates were significant
in and of themselves, LoPucki and Kalin's statistical analysis,
which rests on bivariate rather than multivariate analysis, may fail
to disclose other, more plausible explanations for the disparity in
refiling rates. In the end, the tantalizing data that LoPucki and
Kalin produce forces us to focus squarely on how one measures the
success of any bankruptcy regime.
II. THE RACE TO DELAWARE
The debate over the Delawarization of bankruptcy law par-
allels a more general debate about the behavior of publicly traded
firms. The most enduring debate in corporate law over the last
three decades is whether the well-known tendency of large, publicly
traded firms to incorporate in Delaware increases or decreases so-
cial welfare. Some scholars see a competitive market that generates
a race to the top, others suspect a blatant attempt by states to cater
to the whims of corporate managers that produces a race to the bot-
tom, while still others find a more ambiguous state of affairs." Not
surprisingly, numerous studies have attempted to answer this
question empirically. In our reading of the literature, the best evi-
dence indicates that incorporating in Delaware adds value to a
firm. 12
11. For a summary of these positions, see generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993), and Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1382-86.
12. The most recent and comprehensive study finding positive value from incoporations in
Delaware is ROBERT DAINES, DOES DELAWARE LAW IMPROVE FIRM VALUE? (article draft, on file
with authors). LoPucki and Kalin claim that the extant studies only show that investors believe
that firms incorporating in Delaware are worth more than firms incorporating elsewhere. There
[Vol. 54:2:283286
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Bankruptcy practice and scholarship have followed a similar
course. Today, large publicly held corporations are more likely to
file for Chapter 11 in Delaware than in any other jurisdiction. This
tendency is of more recent vintage than the preference to incorpo-
rate in Delaware. While the dominating presence of Delaware in
the corporate setting dates back eighty years, the rise of Delaware
in the bankruptcy setting has occurred within the last ten. 3 Never-
theless, bankruptcy scholars have been quick to catch up with the
more established debate. Indeed, they have borrowed heavily from
it. 14 As in the chartering context, the debate in the bankruptcy con-
text has been over whether the race to Delaware is to the top, to the
bottom, or somewhere in between. As with the debate over incorpo-
ration, empiricists are trying to select among theories by measuring
reality. 15
LoPucki and Kalin's source for their attempt to find a yard-
stick by which to measure the competing theories is LoPucki's da-
tabase, which consists of all large, publicly traded firms that have
filed for bankruptcy since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code.
Analyzing this data, LoPucki and Kalin claim to have resolved the
issue of how well Delaware performs in the bankruptcy context, and
perhaps to have shed light on the debate in the corporate arena as
well. The variable that they have examined is the propensity of
firms to file for a second reorganization. They find that firms reor-
ganizing in Delaware are four times as likely to file for bankruptcy
a second time as are firms reorganizing elsewhere. Is They conclude
that this tendency proves that the current system has failed.
are, of course, a number of measures by which one can attempt to evaluate firm performance.
One can look at sales, profits, or cash flows. If LoPucki and Kalin were correct, one would expect
that firms with similar financial characteristics would be valued differently based on where they
were incorporated. They have not attempted to make such a showing. Moreover, to the extent
that LoPucki and Kalin explain the preference for Delaware bankruptcy courts as the result of a
lack of information, it is hard to imagine how this explanation could carry over to the incorpora-
tion setting. The effect of incorporating in Delaware has been the subject of intense scrutiny for
the past three decades.
13. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 983-87; Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1,
at 1372-76; Skeel, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 3, at 18-19; Skeel, Lockups, supra note 3, at
1274.
14. Our debt in this regard is obvious. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1382-85.
15. LoPucki has been a leader in detailing the changing pattern of venue selection for large,
publicly held bankruptcies over the past fifteen years. He co-authored both the first study on
venue selection, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 11, and one of the first studies detailing the emerging preference for Delaware, see gener-
ally Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1.
16. LoPucki and Kalin also discuss the refiling rate of firms that filed for bankruptcy in the
erstwhile forum of choice, the Southern District of New York. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 6, at
2001] 287
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Alas, while we are fans of empirical analysis and applaud
LoPucki and Kalin's effort, we cannot agree. Our response to Lo-
Pucki and Kalin's finding requires that we first summarize our the-
ory of what is going on in Delaware. We have not offered a simple
"Delaware Good" or "Delaware Bad" story. Our theory is a bit more
complex. We have argued that, in ascertaining whether the prefer-
ence of firms to file for reorganization in Delaware is beneficial or
not, one has to look at the incentives facing those who make the
filing decision-the firm's managers and their lawyers. The incen-
tives that they face differ according to the type of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding being initiated.
There are two general types of Chapter 11 proceeding initi-
ated by large, publicly held companies-prepackaged bankruptcies
and traditional, full-blown Chapter 11 bankruptcies. A prepackaged
bankruptcy hinges on agreement. The managers of a firm in finan-
cial distress negotiate with the firm's main creditors over a plan of
reorganization prior to the filing for bankruptcy. A bankruptcy peti-
tion is filed only after agreement among the creditors has been
reached on the new debt structure. The benefit of a prepackaged
bankruptcy, as opposed to an out-of-court restructuring, is that it
eliminates the holdout problem endemic in out-of-court restructur-
ings. Absent bankruptcy, debt holders cannot have their claims re-
duced without their consent. This creates a collective action prob-
lem. When a firm needs to alter its capital structure, individual
creditors may opt not to participate in a restructuring that benefits
the creditors as a whole. They hope that, although they refuse to
reduce their own claims, other creditors will reduce theirs. 17
A prepackaged bankruptcy eliminates this incentive for stra-
tegic behavior. Chapter 11 begins by placing creditors in classes
according to the type of claim that they hold.18 It then allows a ma-
jority of creditors in each class who hold over two-thirds of the debt
to bind the dissenters in that class. 19 Prepackaged bankruptcies are
248-51, 266-67. We limit our focus in the main text to Delaware, the current venue of choice. As
to the Southern District of New York, we have expressed our doubts as to whether it advanced
overall welfare when it was the venue of choice. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at
1372. For the reasons that we state in the text, however, we do not believe that LoPucki and
Kalin's finding of elevated refiling rates necessarily supports the conclusion that the preference
for the Southern District was socially detrimental.
17. For an extended discussion of this point, see generally Robert Gertner & David Scharf-
stein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189 (1991), and
Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232 (1987).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1994).
19. Id. § 1126(c).
[Vol. 54:2:283288
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thus consensual arrangements between managers and the majority
of creditors. The requirement of the Bankruptcy Code that all
claims in a given class be treated identically reduces the ability to
appropriate value from dissenting creditors. A majority can bind
the dissent only by agreeing to the same treatment. Indeed, manag-
ers have an incentive to ensure that creditors do not complain about
their treatment. Any dispute that requires litigation to resolve robs
the prepackaged bankruptcy of one of its most attractive features,
speed of completion.20 On average, prepackaged bankruptcies last
roughly one month from filing to completion.21 This is less than ten
percent of the time required for a traditional Chapter 11 proceed-
ing.22
Given the overriding necessity of having all affected classes
of creditors agree to the proposed new capital structure, we have
argued that prepackaged bankruptcies tend to promote the joint
welfare of the firm's owners.23 We have also asserted that having a
single jurisdiction specialize in prepackaged bankruptcy makes a
good deal of sense.24 We have concluded from the available evidence
that, at worst, the Delaware bankruptcy court is doing as good a job
as any jurisdiction in handling prepackaged bankruptcies. Dela-
ware undoubtedly handles prepackaged cases faster than any other
jurisdiction when measured by both the mean and median times.
While one cannot rule out the hypothesis that these faster times are
the result of chance, 25 it remains that Delaware appears to be
faster. When managers have to select a forum, they must base their
decision on available evidence. They cannot wait for statistical sig-
nificance. To the extent that speed is a virtue, they have a compel-
ling reason to select Delaware. Removing Delaware as an appropri-
ate place for filing prepackaged cases has little to commend it.26
We have been more agnostic on whether the preference for
firms to file in Delaware when they sought a full-blown reorganiza-
20. For extended elaboration of the mechanism of a prepackaged bankruptcy, see Rasmus-
sen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1374-76, 1386-91.
21. Id. at 1388.
22. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 987-92.
23. Rasmussen &Thomas, supra note 1, at 1387-91.
24. Id. at 1388-89.
25. Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki found that the quicker mean time in Delaware was
not statistically significant, Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 990-91, but a second study
concluded that the median times were statistically significant, see Maria Carapeto, Does Debtor-
in-Possession Financing Add Value?, 24-25 (March 12, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
26. Given the significant difference between a prepackaged bankruptcy and a traditional
Chapter 11 proceeding, it would have been useful if LoPucki and Kalin had analyzed traditional
Chapter 11 cases separately rather than lumping them with prepackaged cases.
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tion under Chapter 11 promoted overall social welfare. The manag-
ers of a firm and the lawyers who advise them will look after their
own interests. In the situation of a prepackaged bankruptcy, they
have to get the creditors to agree with them. This is not the case in
the traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Here, disagreement be-
tween managers and creditors is common-both over the deploy-
ment of the firm's assets and the treatment of creditors' claims-
and proceedings, on average, last over one year.27 We have assumed
that counsel would advise managers where to file, and we have
identified three reasons why lawyers would prefer one forum over
another: predictability of decisions by the jurisdiction (a notable
factor given that jurisdictions often have more than a single bank-
ruptcy judge), a track record of decisions by the bankruptcy judge
that favor the firm's managers, and the routine approval of attor-
neys' fees.
The first of these reasons arguably benefits all of a firm's
claimants. Predictability in law, especially in the corporate area, is
generally thought to be a good thing.28 The routine approval of at-
torneys' fees is a more ambiguous matter. Attorneys' fees are paid
from the estate, so managers arguably have little incentive to moni-
tor these fees. Still, there may be other constraints on fees. We
know of no evidence suggesting that corporate bankruptcy attor-
neys are compensated at a greater rate than corporate attorneys
generally. It may be that judicial approval of fees pegged at the
market rate is necessary to attract the top legal talent. All parties
may benefit when the debtor can afford to hire the best attorneys.
Perhaps the most likely reason why managers would not
choose the reorganization forum that benefits all those with an in-
terest in the firm is that the interests of managers diverge from
those of creditors at the time a traditional Chapter 11 begins. Man-
agers may want to control the Chapter 11 process. Crucial here is
the ability to remain in charge and to retain the exclusive authority
to file a plan of reorganization. The inability of creditors to file a
competing plan can induce creditors to agree to a plan of reorgani-
zation offered by management simply to terminate the proceeding.
Jurisdictions may also differ in their willingness to replace existing
managers during the proceeding. Thus, we have suggested that
managers may choose to file in a jurisdiction that promotes their
27. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 1, at 1388.
28. See id. at 1368-69.
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interests at the expense of creditors. We have not been able to con-
clude, on balance, which of the various incentives dominates.
The normative conclusion that we have drawn from this
analysis is that prior commentators who have argued for constrict-
ing venue choice have gotten the prescription exactly backwards. To
the extent that there is a problem with forum selection, it is not
that there are too many forums to choose from; rather, there are too
few. Bankruptcy judges evidently want to attract these cases to
their courts. Competition can be a good thing. The key to our pro-
posal is to change the time at which the selection is made. We have
proposed that venue rules be changed so that firms can commit in
advance to filing in any particular jurisdiction in the event that a
reorganization is necessary.
LoPucki and Kaln's data offer little insight into the validity
of our theory. Our theory differentiates between traditional Chap-
ter 11 cases and prepackaged bankruptcies based on the incentives
that mangers face when they decide in which venue to file. There is
a second reason for differentiating between these two types of pro-
ceedings. We suspect that firms filing for prepackaged bankruptcy
may differ significantly from firms filing a traditional Chapter 11
proceeding. This difference stems from the nature of the two pro-
ceedings. A prepackaged bankruptcy allows a firm to adjust its
capital structure, but it is not a good vehicle for changing its opera-
tions. A full Chapter 11 proceeding, on the other hand, allows both
an adjustment of capital structure and a revamping of operations.
Thus, one would expect prepackaged bankruptcies to be initiated
when the firm's managers believe that the firm may be experienc-
ing only financial distress and not economic distress. If the manag-
ers conclude that the firm is facing both financial and economic dis-
tress, the better choice is to file for Chapter 11. To be sure, there is
the possibility that a firm filing a prepackaged bankruptcy may in
fact be facing economic distress as well. We would expect these
firms would subsequently file a second reorganization petition, this
one for a traditional Chapter 11 proceeding. 9 Our point is that, on
average, one would expect firms that file a prepackaged bankruptcy
29. In this respect, one can view the filing of a prepackaged bankruptcy as an attempt by
managers to screen out the cause of the firm's financial distress. If the distress is caused only by
a mismatch between the capital structure and the firm's operations, the prepackaged bankruptcy
should solve the problem. If the distress is caused by the firm's operations as well, one would
expect that a second reorganization proceeding is needed. Note here that this second reorganiza-
tion proceeding should not be considered a failure of the first bankruptcy proceeding. The first
proceeding was designed to separate out those firms that need a full.blown Chapter 11 proceed-
ing from those that do not.
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to be less in need of restructuring their operations than firms
seeking a full-blown reorganization under Chapter 11. Thus, we
believe that, to assess the effects of venue choice, it is necessary to
separate prepackaged and traditional Chapter 11 cases.
LoPucki and Kalin fail to adhere to this separation. The first
set of data that they report, most prominently in Tables 4 and 5,
lumps both types of proceedings together. For the reasons that we
have discussed, we believe that such a combination is not justified.
Nowhere do they analyze traditional Chapter 11 cases as a discrete
data set. This being the case, we see no evidence as to how Dela-
ware is performing in the handling of traditional Chapter 11 cases
as compared to all other jurisdictions.
LoPucki and Kahn do, however, break out the data for pre-
packaged bankruptcies. They claim that they get a statistically sig-
nificant difference between Delaware and other bankruptcy courts
in this area, with Delaware prepackaged bankruptcies more likely
to need a second reorganization. To get this significance, however,
they have to limit their data set in two ways. The first is that they
limit their focus to cases filed after 1990. The reason for this focus
is that Delaware only became the preferred venue at that time. We
understand the reason for this limited focus and do not quarrel
with it. We bring it up only to note that the effect of this exclusion
is to remove two cases from the data set, neither of which filed in
Delaware. One of these two cases eventually resulted in a second
petition being filed. Had these two cases been included in the data
set, LoPucki and Kahn's results would not have been statistically
significant. The fact that such a small change in the data affects
whether the results are statistically significant gives us pause in
placing too much reliance on the conclusions.
The second limitation that LoPucki and Kalin make is, to our
minds, more troubling. They compare Delaware bankruptcy courts
to other bankruptcy courts excluding the Southern District of New
York. This exclusion is significant in that the Southern District had
three prepackaged bankruptcy cases, one of which filed for bank-
ruptcy a second time. Given that adding two cases to the data set,
one of which refied, would prevent a finding of statistical signifi-
cance, it may be that adding these three cases, one of which refied,
would also undo LoPucki and Kahn's finding of statistical signifi-
cance. Thus, the reason for the exclusion of these cases must be ex-
amined. To be sure, in the period before 1990, the Southern District
of New York was the venue of choice for large, publicly traded firms
fiing for bankruptcy. Yet we see no logical reason why this would
lead to the exclusion from the data set of cases that were filed after
[Vol. 54:2:283292
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the Southern District had lost its status as the venue of choice. If
one wants to measure how well Delaware performed in the 1990s,
the Delaware court should be measured against all of its competi-
tors. We therefore cannot conclude anything definitive about the
relationship between venue choice and refiling rates in either the
traditional Chapter 11 or prepackaged bankruptcy context.
Though it does not appear to be statistically significant, the
LoPucki and Kalin data set is suggestive. We certainly cannot prove
that there is no correlation between venue choice and refilling rates
in either traditional Chapter 11 cases or prepackaged bankruptcies.
It may well be that, as the number of cases in the data set increases
over time, a statistically significant correlation will emerge. We
thus believe it prudent to address the possible implications of find-
ing higher refiling rates for firms emerging from bankruptcy court
in Delaware. In short, we do not believe that higher refiling rates
necessarily imply that the Delaware bankruptcy court is performing
worse than its peers. First, we do not find refiling rates to be an
accurate barometer of the performance of a bankruptcy court. Sec-
ond, even if refiling were indicative of judicial performance, it may
be that a high refiling rate increases overall social welfare. We ad-
dress these points in turn.
III. WHY REFILINGS?
LoPucki and Kahn offer two reasons why a second petition
should be treated as a failure of the initial bankruptcy proceeding.
They argue that such treatment is warranted because the Bank-
ruptcy Code condemns refilings and because refilings are costly.30
Neither argument supports their conclusion. The Code, in fact, does
not condemn refilings. Rather, it only requires that the bankruptcy
judge approving a plan of reorganization determine that "confirma-
tion of the plan is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the
need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor."31 The Code
thus does not require that refilings be avoided at all costs. Rather,
it only requires that a plan of reorganization is not likely to lead to
a second reorganization. Roughly 70% of the firms that file in
Delaware do not need a second reorganization. It thus appears to us
that this statutory requirement is being met. Indeed, as we show
below, there may be an optimal, non-zero rate of refiling. In other
30. LoPucki & Kahin, supra note 6, at 235-36.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1994).
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words, the Bankruptcy Code seeks to bar too high a refiling rate; it
does not seek to eliminate refilings altogether.
The second reason LoPucki and Kahn offer as to why the
filing of a second bankruptcy petition implies that the first pro-
ceeding should be considered a failure is that high costs are associ-
ated with bankruptcy, and a second petition implies that these
costs are incurred a second time.32 This observation is no doubt
true. It does not, however, justify a rigid focus on refiling rates for
at least three reasons.
The first problem with focusing exclusively on refiling rates
is that a recurrence of financial distress does not necessarily lead to
a second bankruptcy proceeding. Financial distress, even when it
does not lead to a bankruptcy petition, is costly. A firm in financial
distress may be a ripe candidate for a takeover, it may put itself on
the auction block, it may initiate an out-of-court restructuring, or it
may have to sharply curtail (or even eliminate) its operations. A
Chapter 11 proceeding that leaves the firm vulnerable to financial
downturns may lead to results other than a second bankruptcy peti-
tion.
A quick glance at LoPucki's data highlights the problem. By
our count, of 183 firms in LoPucki's data set, only seventy-six (42%)
are still being followed. Fifty-eight percent of the firms that
emerged from Chapter 11 no longer meet the criteria LoPucki es-
tablished for being followed. Of the thirty-two firms that emerged
from reorganization in Delaware, thirteen (41%) remained in the
data set by the cutoff date. For all other jurisdictions, sixty-three of
151 (42%) remained under observation to the end of the period. To
be sure, given that Delaware cases, on average, tend to be younger,
it may be that Delaware firms are more likely to fail to meet the
criterion for being followed. We have not been able to verify this
proposition one way or the other from the data we have. Still, it is
striking that less than half of the companies reorganized under
Chapter 11 fail to meet the standards for being followed, and there
is no obvious difference between Delaware and other jurisdictions.
Thus, once the focus is on companies that have remained in the
data set to the end of the study period, we see no results in the data
suggesting that Delaware fares worse than its competitors.
A second reason refiling may not be a fair indicator of a
court's performance is that LoPucki and Kalin fail to distinguish
adequately between a refiling after a traditional Chapter 11 pro-
32. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 6, at 236.
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ceeding and a refiling after a prepackaged bankruptcy. One would
expect a higher rate of refiling after a prepackaged bankruptcy
than after a traditional Chapter 11. A firm in financial distress may
or may not be in economic distress as well. If the firm is suffering
from only financial distress, all that is needed is a new capital
structure. If it is suffering from economic distress as well, however,
it needs to revamp its operations. Yet it may be unclear to those in
charge if a firm in financial distress is also in economic distress.
Diverting all cash flow to debt service may prevent an accurate as-
sessment of how the firm would operate were some of that cash flow
retained in its operations. In this ambiguous situation, it would
seem to be a rational strategy to attempt a prepackaged bank-
ruptcy. If in fact the firm is only in financial distress, the prepack-
aged bankruptcy should relieve that distress. If, however, it turns
out that, even with the new capital structure, the firm continues to
lose money, the firm is probably in economic distress as well, and a
more expansive Chapter 11 proceeding is needed. A prepackaged
bankruptcy can be used in this way as a means to ascertain
whether the firm is suffering from economic distress in addition to
financial distress. The fact that a full-blown Chapter 11 proceeding
follows a prepackaged bankruptcy cannot thus be viewed as a fail-
ure of the system.
The third reason the cost of a second refiling does not justify
focusing on refilings is that there may be an optimal, non-zero re-
filing rate. Bankruptcy proceedings are costly affairs, but they do
not have a fixed cost. An unstated premise of LoPucki and Kaln's
article is that the initial bankruptcy proceeding costs the same re-
gardless of the jurisdiction handling the case. Once one relaxes that
assumption-and there is empirical evidence justifying such a re-
laxation-the benefits of a cheaper, less extensive Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding may exceed the costs of increasing the necessity of a second
reorganization.
We start with the proposition that Delaware processes its
bankruptcy cases more quickly than other jurisdictions do. There is
empirical support for this proposition.33 Bankruptcy proceedings
have direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs include the fees
paid to various professionals such as lawyers, advisors, and ac-
countants. These fees may be correlated roughly with the length of
the bankruptcy proceeding. The longer the proceeding, the greater
the fees. The indirect costs of bankruptcy, which may well exceed
33. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 989.
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the direct costs, 34 stem from the distraction caused by Chapter 11.
The firm's managers must focus on the reorganization proceeding
rather than running the firm. Creditors may be hesitant to deal
with a firm in bankruptcy. It seems fair to assume that these indi-
rect costs are directly correlated with the length of time that a firm
remains in bankruptcy. It logically follows that quicker bankruptcy
proceedings will, on average, be cheaper affairs.
To be sure, there is a cost attached to quickness. Speed may
indicate a less thorough-going examination of the needs of the reor-
ganized entity. As LoPucki and Kahn intimate, enough questions
may not be asked, or managers may be retained when they should
be shown the door.35 Operating plans may be approved that, on re-
flection, should have been jettisoned. Thus, there may be a trade-off
between the cost of a procedure and the results. Such tradeoffs are
ubiquitous in law.36
The fact that one has to make tradeoffs gives us no insight
as to what the appropriate balance is. It may well be the case that
all the owners of a firm benefit from a quicker proceeding even
though such a proceeding is more likely to lead to a subsequent re-
filing. To be concrete, assume there is a 70% chance that a firm fil-
ing for reorganization in Delaware will emerge as a healthy com-
pany that will not need to refile. Filing in another jurisdiction leads
to a 90% chance that the firm will emerge as a healthy company.
These numbers roughly approximate those generated by LoPucki
and Kahn. LoPucki's prior work in this area, done with Ted Eisen-
berg, shows that Delaware processes a traditional Chapter 11 case,
on average, in 510 days. Other jurisdictions (excluding New York,
which needs, on average, 765 days to conclude a case) process a case
in 620 days.37 Stated differently, Delaware processes a case in
roughly 80% of the time as do other jurisdictions. Assume, for the
sake of argument, that the overall cost of bankruptcy, which in-
cludes both direct costs and indirect costs, is directly proportional
34. See generally Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy
Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067 (1984); Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Finan.
cial (Not Economic) Distress: Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Became Dis-
tressed, 53 J. FIN. 1443 (1998).
35. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 6, at 264.
36. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (concluding that, in proco-
dural due process cases, the Supreme Court must consider "three distinct factors: First, the pri-
vate interest ... affected by official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used[] ... and finally ... the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail").
37. See Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 1, at 989.
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to the amount of time spent in bankruptcy. Thus, the cost of pro-
ceeding in Delaware would be 80% of the cost of proceeding in an-
other jurisdiction.
These numbers would lead one to hope that the managers
would choose to file in Delaware, even though a subsequent refiling
is three times as likely. The expected cost of proceeding in Dela-
ware is given by the cost of the first proceeding plus the expected
cost of any future proceeding, discounted to present value. Symboli-
cally, c6 = D + pD, where D is the cost of a Delaware proceeding, 8 is
the firm's discount rate, and p is the probability of refiling in Dela-
ware. 38 For filing the first reorganization case in another jurisdic-
tion, the cost is given by co 0 + 5qO, where 0 is the cost of pro-
ceeding in the other jurisdiction, and q is the likelihood of having to
refile in that jurisdiction. Recall that p = 0.3 in Delaware and
q = 0.1, and that D = 0.8[0]. Plugging these values in, we get a cost
of filing in Delaware of 0.8[0] + 5.24[0] and a cost of filing in other
jurisdictions of 0 + 8.1[0]. When one subtracts the cost of filing in
Delaware from the cost of filing in another jurisdiction, filing in
Delaware is less expensive, even considering the cost of being three
times as likely to need a subsequent reorganization, so long as
0.2[0] - 5.14[0] > 0, or 1.43 > 5. Thus, filing in Delaware will be
cheaper as long as the firm's discount rate is less than 143%. Given
that it is impossible to imagine a firm having such a high discount
rate-it would mean that $1.00 in the future is worth $1.43 today-
it is easy to see that filing in Delaware may be the cost-effective
choice.
To be sure, our simple formula may not include all costs of
refiling, and there may be a more complicated relationship between
the time in bankruptcy and the cost of bankruptcy. 39 More complex
models could be developed. Our basic point is not that we have cor-
rectly captured the costs of refiling; rather, it is that, even if one
assumes refiling to be costly in the abstract, one cannot be sure
that Delaware's higher refiling rate is inefficient. When evaluating
any product, price is always an attribute to be considered. Given
that we know that Delaware is faster, before condemning the Dela-
38. Ve are assuming here that only two filings are possible. To extent that a second bank-
ruptcy would have a 30% chance of leading to a third (an issue on which we have no data), this
would affect the numbers slightly, though the general point would follow through.
39. For example, our model implicitly assumes that all refilings occur after a single period.
A more complete model would discount the cost of refilings based on the number of periods be-
tween the first bankruptcy and refiling. Such a refinement would, of curse, reduce even further
the expected cost of a second bankruptcy proceeding.
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ware refiling rate, we need to know more about the price at which
Delaware is selling its product.
It follows from all of this that refiling rates, in and of them-
selves, do not necessarily provide a benchmark for measuring reor-
ganization practice. This observation exposes perhaps the most cru-
cial problem with LoPucki and Kahn's project: it fails to offer a ro-
bust definition of what constitutes a successful Chapter 11 pro-
ceeding.
In attempting to assess Chapter 11 practice, LoPucki and
Kalin focus only on firms that have emerged from Chapter 11 as
operating companies. Yet this focus seems unduly narrow. Recall,
for example, that LoPucki's sample began with 240 cases, and over
21% of these firms were liquidated 40 rather than reorganized. Do
these cases represent a success or failure of Chapter 11? Were one
to view the goal of Chapter 11 as reorganization at all costs, this
21% would be a failure. But a sale of the assets can often be viewed
as a success. Indeed, academics have argued strongly that an auc-
tion, as opposed to a reorganization, is the best way to resolve the
financial distress of large, publicly held companies. 41 To be more
concrete, consider the case of ICO Global Communications Ltd.42
ICO filed for bankruptcy in Delaware in August of 1999. In October
of 1999, Craig McCaw in essence agreed to buy 80% of the firm for
$1.2 billion. ICO emerged from bankruptcy on May 17, 2000, and
was immediately merged with another firm owned by McCaw. By
all accounts, this was a much better outcome than most anticipated
when ICO filed for bankruptcy. 43 Yet this case, had it ended prior to
LoPucki and Kalin's cutoff date, would not have been included in
the data set because it was not an independent firm after bank-
ruptcy.
Ultimately, success in a Chapter 11 proceeding is measured
by whether the assets were deployed to their highest valued use,
whether the firm had a capital structure consistent with its reve-
40. Liquidation in this context includes sales of assets as going concerns, not just piecemeal
liquidations.
41. See Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986); see also Philippe Aghion et al., The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 523 (1992); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations,
101 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1988); Robert D. Hanson & Randall S. Thomas, Auctions in Bankruptcy:
Theoretical Analysis and Practical Guidance, 18 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 159 (1998).
42. The timing of the ICO Global bankruptcy is such that it is not included in Professor Lo.
Pucki's data set.
43. See Scott Thurm & Paul M. Sheer, Deals & Deal Makers: ICO, Wasserstein Clash in
Battle over Hefty Bailout Fee, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2000, at C1.
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nues, and whether these two objectives were achieved in the most
cost-effective manner." To be sure, refiling is evidence that this
may not have occurred. As we discuss more fully below, a firm may
need a second reorganization because it may have failed to reduce
its debt load sufficiently in the first reorganization, it may have re-
tained a suboptimal business strategy, or it may have done both.
Perhaps these firms should have had a different plan of reorganiza-
tion, or perhaps they should have been auctioned off. Yet it may be
that some firms emerging from Chapter 11 and not refiling should
have been sold during bankruptcy. Before condemning or condoning
Delaware, one needs a robust theory of what constitutes a success-
ful Chapter 11 proceeding. A narrow focus on refiling rates simply
will not do.
IV. THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN DATA AND CONCLUSIONS
While a focus on refiling rates cannot tell us whether the
stampede to Delaware for corporate reorganizations should be ap-
plauded or opposed, we could still learn something from the data
LoPucki and Kalin have generated. In particular, we could discern
what it is about reorganization in Delaware that leads to a higher
refiling rate. 5 If we knew the causes of the refiling rate, we would
be in a better position to assess its normative impact. This would
require a multivariate analysis of the causes of refiling rates.
Statistical analysis of multivariate empirical data normally
proceeds in two steps. First, the researcher formulates a well-
articulated theory about what they are trying to prove or disprove.
For example, if the scholar wishes to test whether increases in
variable X lead to increases in variable Y, then she must provide a
theory of why this should be true. In this case, LoPucki and Kalin
have assumed the burden of providing us with a theory explaining
why more companies making bankruptcy filings in Delaware (vari-
able X) leads to a disproportionately high number of bankruptcy
refilings by those companies (variable Y). As we discuss below, Lo-
Pucki and Kalin have not fully explained why there may be a causal
relationship between these two variables. A theory of causality is
crucial; without it, the researcher suffers from the "omitted variable
44. See Robert K Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effect of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment In-
centives, 72 WASI U. LQ. 1159, 1160-61 (1994).
45. In this Section, we are assuming for the sake of argument that the differences in refiling
rates between Delaware and other jurisdictions for both prepackaged bankruptcies and tradi-
tional Chapter 11 cases are statistically significant.
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problem," in which a different, unmeasured variable is actually
driving the results that one sees.
The second step in empirical analysis is. to generate a model
to test the hypotheses that the researcher derives from her theory.
The type of model that she employs will depend upon the relation-
ship that she is trying to capture and the number of factors that
influence it. Here, LoPucki and Kahn have a wide variety of possi-
ble models that they could have used to test for the purported
causal connection between bankruptcy filings in Delaware and the
refiling rate. A number of variables that might affect this relation-
ship would also need to be incorporated into such a model, sug-
gesting that LoPucki and Kalin should have incorporated some
form of multivariate analysis. They do not employ such a model, nor
do they examine all possible variables. LoPucki and Kahn's simple
bivariate testing raises more questions than it answers. As they
themselves acknowledge, none of their results does more than sug-
gest avenues for future researchers to investigate.
A. What is the Relationship Between Bankruptcy Filings in
Delaware and the Refiling Rate?
Unanswered by LoPucki and Kahn is the question of what
causes a firm to file a second bankruptcy, or, more precisely, what
did or did not happen in the first bankruptcy that left the firm vul-
nerable to a second bankruptcy proceeding. One can imagine at
least three possibilities. The first is that there was not sufficient
debt reduction to alleviate financial distress. Stuart Gilson suggests
this possibility in his study of firms that adjust their capital struc-
ture, both in and out of bankruptcy.46 Gilson shows that firms
leaving a bankruptcy proceeding are more highly leveraged than
most firms in their industry. The more leverage, the more likely a
firm is going to run into financial difficulties in the future. Con-
firming this positive correlation between leverage and bankruptcy,
Professor Gilson also shows that firms undergoing out-of-court re-
structuring are likely to remain more leveraged, and are more
likely to undergo a second restructuring, than firms going through
Chapter 11. In other words, Gilson finds that firms reduce more
debt in Chapter 11 than they do in out-of-court restructurings, but
they still do not reduce sufficient debt to inoculate themselves from
a second bout with financial distress.
46. See generally Stuart C. Gilson, Transaction Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evi.
dence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. FIN. 161 (1997).
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The second reason that a firm may need to visit Chapter 11 a
second time is that the firm did not change its operations enough to
alleviate its economic distress. Some bankrupt firms simply need a
new capital structure. Their operations are sound in that they gen-
erate operating revenues that exceed operating costs, but they can-
not service their debt load. They are suffering financial distress but
not economic distress. Cases such as Johns Manville and Texaco fall
into this category.
Other cases, in contrast, involve firms that need to restruc-
ture not only their capital structure but also their operations. The
firm, absent dramatic change, is not economically viable. It cannot
make up in volume what it loses in each transaction. It may need to
shed assets and focus on its core business. If a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding only addresses the firm's capital structure but fails to cor-
rect defects in its operations, a second trip to the tank will be inevi-
table. Perhaps firms filing in Delaware alter their operational focus
to a lesser extent than firms filing elsewhere.
In either of these scenarios-the firm remains too highly lev-
eraged, or the firm remains too highly leveraged and with ineffi-
cient operations-one could surmise that bankruptcies in Delaware
leave firms more leveraged than those in other jurisdictions. Dela-
ware practice may lead firms to reduce debt less than other juris-
dictions. 47 Creditors, understandably, resist what they view as an
unwarranted reduction of their claims. Perhaps managers in Dela-
ware buy the peace by not antagonizing creditors through aggres-
sive debt reductions. This effort at appeasement could result from
managers' desires to retain their positions, to end the proceeding as
quickly as possible, or to craft a reorganization plan that gives a
portion of the reorganized firm to the equity holders of the pre-
bankruptcy firm.
The third possible reason a firm may refile is that it has ex-
perienced an external shock to its business. Even if a firm leaves
bankruptcy with a sensible capital structure and healthy opera-
tions, it is not assured success. A sudden downturn in the sector,
the rise of a new competitor, or a post-bankruptcy decision that
turns out poorly can all result in a second bankruptcy proceeding
involving the same firm. Whether this cause of refiling for an indi-
vidual firm can plausibly explain the difference in refiling rates be-
47. LoPucki and Kalin note Gilson's work in passing, but make no attempt to use their data
to look at the leverage ratios of the firms in their study. Moreover, they offer no reason as to the
incentives that managers may have to steer their firm to a jurisdiction that permits plans of
reorganization with higher than average leverage ratios.
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tween Delaware and the rest of the country is a difficult question. If
the firms filing in Delaware were a random subset of firms filing
nationally, the risk of external shocks would be randomly distrib-
uted across the sample, and that risk could not plausibly explain
the differing refiling rates. Given that there seems to be a great
variation in the types of firms that fie for bankruptcy, however,
there may be something about the nature of the firms ending up in
Delaware that left them more vulnerable to unexpected changes.
While this explanation is plausible, we view it as the least likely of
the three.
We thus have three possible reasons as to why the bank-
ruptcy practice in Delaware may lead more firms filing there to
seek a second reorganization. Which reason or combination of rea-
sons is true affects what policy prescriptions one endorses.
LoPucki and Kalin do not consider any of these explanations
for Delaware's refiling rate. Instead, they identify four scenarios
they claim might explain their refiling rate data: the "potential for
huge gains" from a risky reorganization plan;48 the possibility that
Delaware handles "a disproportionate share of the most difficult
cases;"49 the potential for differences in the size of the firms filing in
Delaware;50 and finally, the possibility, based on anecdotal informa-
tion about three cases, that "the Delaware court did not appear to
be making informed decisions on which risks to undertake."5 1 While
they claim to test each of these factors' importance as alternative
explanations, the authors pay little attention to the first three, and
leave little doubt that they believe the only explanation is that the
Delaware court "abdicates its statutory obligation to determine
whether the proposed reorganization is feasible." 2 Yet they offer no
definitive data for this conclusion. Given the other explanations
that we offer above, the cause of Delaware's higher refiling rate re-
mains open to speculation.
48. Lopucki and Kalin, supra note 6 at 255.
49. Id. at 257.
50. Id. at 257-59.
51. Id. at 259. This last explanation may be consistent with Delaware's speed in processing
cases.
52. Id. at 264.
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B. How Should We Test a Theory Suggesting That Increases in
Bankruptcy Filings in Delaware Lead to Increases in the Refiling
Rate?
Despite their failure to articulate a comprehensive theory
about the nature of a bankruptcy practice in Delaware that suppos-
edly causes higher levels of bankruptcy refilings, LoPucki and Kalin
push ahead to analyze their data set using bivariate analysis. The
heart of their analysis is reproduced in Tables 5 and 7, where they
present data showing the bankruptcy refiling rates for all bank-
ruptcies and bankruptcy refiling rates for prepackaged bankrupt-
cies only.53 They find that the refiling rates for all bankruptcies-
traditional Chapter 11 and prepackaged bankruptcies combined6'-
filed in Delaware are statistically significantly higher than for all
bankruptcies filed in all other jurisdictions. They make a similar,
but much weaker, finding that refiling rates for prepackaged bank-
ruptcies are higher for Delaware compared to all other jurisdictions
excluding the Southern District of New York.55
These are interesting results, but simply comparing the av-
erage refiling rates of different courts only tells us whether there is
a significant difference between them. It does not tell us much
about the reasons for the difference and whether the difference is
solely attributable to the court handling the case. To answer that
question, we need to control for the other factors that may affect
refiling rates for bankruptcy proceedings.
It is here that LoPucki and Kalin speculate about what those
factors might be. While we explore the tests that LoPucki and Kalin
employ of the effects of these variables below, it is worth pausing to
ask whether they have controlled for the most important factors
that influence bankruptcy refilings. In this regard, we think that
the answer must be no. As we noted above, refilings could stem
from a failure to alter the capital structure so as to relieve financial
53. No separate statistics are presented for Chapter 11 bankruptcies only. VWhile it is un-
clear from looking at the data presented in the article if the deletion of the prepackaged bank-
ruptcies from the whole sample would alter the significance of the basic bivariate result, it would
clearly result in different rates of refiling for Chapter 11 proceedings from those presented for all
filings. It would be useful, therefore, to discuss refiling rates for Chapter 11 proceedings in a
separate table from those for prepackaged bankruptcies, rather than lump those rates together
as LoPucki and Kalin have. At the least, the article ought to present the results of testing for
statistical significance of refiling rates for Chapter 11 proceedings in Delaware and other juris-
dictions so that the reader can see if the bivariate results hold up.
54. For our criticism of this combination, see supra text accompanying notes 17-26.
55. Again, we are puzzled by the exclusion of the Southern District. See supra text at pages
292-93.
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distress, a failure to revamp the operations of the firm to relieve
economic distress, or from external shocks that affect those firms
emerging from Delaware as opposed to some other jurisdiction. We
would think that it would be important to determine if, for example,
leverage ratios differed between companies filing in Delaware and
those filing in other jurisdictions, and how the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding in the different courts affected them. Similarly, one could
compare operating revenues and expenses in the period before filing
with the period after completion of the initial reorganization to as-
certain the extent to which the firm has shed assets in Chapter 11.
Moreover, to truly assess the performance of Delaware, Lo-
Pucki and Kahn should have considered dispositions other than
emergence after Chapter 11. Chapter 11 often results in the sale of
all or substantially all of a firm's assets. Indeed, the auctioning off
of assets upon the filing of a Chapter 11 petition seems to be a
growing trend,56 perhaps because it may well be the most efficient
means of resolving the financial distress of large, publicly held
companies. 57 If what LoPucki and Kahn worry about is refiling,
they should rejoice when the assets of a firm are sold to a healthy
third party. Short of a complete sale, a bankruptcy proceeding could
sell off a substantial portion of a firm's assets. In fact, if Delaware
were more likely to auction off valuable assets than other jurisdic-
tions, this could explain its higher failure rate. The valuable assets
are sold to a third party, and the firm tries to make a go with the
more risky assets for which there is less of a market.
Furthermore, LoPucki and Kahn make no attempt to list any
other important variables that might need to be considered, if data
on them were available. For instance, the central theme of LoPucki
and Kahn's critique of Delaware bankruptcy courts is that they fail
to scrutinize the agreement that creditors and management reach.
What is the direct evidence of this? Are Delaware bankruptcy fil-
ings leading to lower levels of debt reduction, on average, across the
companies in the sample? Are managers at companies filing for
bankruptcy in Delaware, on average, deriving some benefits that
managers filing elsewhere are not? These variables are critical to
testing the thesis of their article.
56. See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of Corporate
Bankruptcy Law, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 104-06 (1995).
57. See generally Baird, supra note 41. A related trend is the use of bankruptcy to con-
summate a sale of the firm that has been agreed to prior to the bankruptcy filing. TWA and
American Airlines are currently using this strategy to enable American to purchase TWA.
TWA's bankruptcy petition, not surprisingly, was filed in Delaware.
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Finally, much of the criticism of the rise of the Delawariza-
tion of bankruptcy law centered on one judge, Helen Balick.5 8
Rightly or wrongly, detractors of Delaware have pointed to her as
the cause of Delaware's failures. Judge Balick has since left the
bench, but Delaware continues to be the preferred bankruptcy
venue for large, publicly held corporations to file for bankruptcy.
Judge Balick's cases dominate LoPucki and Kalin's data set. Ac-
cording to the data that they have generously shared with us, of
thirty-two cases fied in Delaware, Judge Balick handled twenty-
five, the other bankruptcy judge (Judge Walsh) handled six, and the
two judges together handled the one remaining. To be sure, the re-
filing rate between the two judges appears roughly similar. Seven of
Judge Balick's cases (28%) ended up going through Chapter 11
twice, two of Judge Walsh's cases (33%) needed a second Chapter 11
proceeding, and the one case with which they were both involved
ended up refiling. Nevertheless, given the large presence of a single
judge in the data, it bears watching how the refiling rate changes-
if at all-as cases handled by other Delaware bankruptcy judges are
added to the mix.
More generally, the effect of all of the variables affecting
bankruptcy refiling rates, including the ones discussed by LoPucki
and Kalin, can only be sorted out if a multivariate form of statisti-
cal analysis is used. For instance, economists commonly use multi-
ple regression analysis to model linear multivariate relationships to
determine the contributions, if any, of the different variables to the
hypothesized causal relationship.
Turning to LoPucki and Kalin's efforts to control for the ef-
fects of other variables on bankruptcy refiling rates, it is important
first to note that these are all bivariate "tests" of the significance of
these variables. While perhaps indicative of things to look for in a
multivariate analysis, bivariate tests can be misleading. Variables
that often seem important in bivariate analysis often have no sig-
nificance in multivariate testing. Thus, we might find that the court
hearing a bankruptcy case, while apparently important in deter-
mining 'efiling rates in a bivariate analysis, is statistically unim-
portant once multivariate statistical techniques are employed.
Finally, even as a bivariate analyses, LoPucki and Kaln's ef-
forts to examine the effect of the factors that they identify as poten-
tially important fail to provide much guidance. For example, Lo-
Pucki and Kalin claim that they wish to determine if Delaware's
58. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 6, at 267.
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high refiling rate is caused by its having received a disproportion-
ate share of the most difficult bankruptcy cases.5 9 To test this
proposition, they try to determine the types of businesses most
likely to file for bankruptcy using one digit SIC codes as a method
of classifying firms by type, and then comparing how many of these
cases are handled by the different courts. They find that Delaware
does not receive a disproportionate number of manufacturing and
retail trade bankruptcies, which appear to be the single SIC code
categories with the highest refiling rates. This is an interesting re-
sult that needs to be further explored, despite the obvious problems
created by their small sample size for statistical testing.
The basic problem is that single digit SIC codes are an over-
broad measure for determining which firms are most likely to file
bankruptcies, as they group together a broad range of businesses
that have very little in common.60 Even though they find statisti-
cally significant differences in the types of single digit SIC busi-
nesses filing for bankruptcy, it is difficult to interpret this finding
for comparative purposes when such a broad range of firms falls
within each category. 61 We suggest that LoPucki and Kalin could
enrich their analysis by adding further comparisons of the firms
within the manufacturing and retail trade categories to try to gen-
erate further details about these comparisons.
The remaining efforts to control for the effects of other vari-
ables are also unpersuasive. For instance, LoPucki and Kalin test
for differences in the size of companies that file for bankruptcy in
Delaware versus other jurisdictions. It is unclear why they believe
that size should make a difference in refiling rates. Perhaps there
are good reasons to think it should, but they are not spelled out in
the article.
LoPucki and Kalin also claim to test whether Delaware re-
ceives a disproportionate share of high-risk bankruptcies. Here it
would seem that we would want to define a high risk bankruptcy
using measures of economic distress or financial distress, so that a
higher risk company would be one that is deeper in the hole and
59. Id. at 257.
60. For example, the one digit SIC code 2, which includes retail stores of various kinds, also
includes automobiles and auto parts, building materials, hardware and tools, hotels, household
furnishings, publishing, the gaming industry, textiles, advertising services, and commercial and
consumer services.
61. Given the small number of observations in the sample, it may well be impossible to gen-
erate meaningful statistical comparisons using two digit SIC code categories. This lack of data
does not negate our basic point that the measure used is a very imprecise one for the teit that
the authors are trying to conduct.
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less likely to emerge than a lower risk company. Instead of using
this measure, LoPucki and Kalin tell us that, based on their "casual
examination" of the data, there do not appear to be any dramatic
successes.
62
V. CONCLUSION
These limitations on LoPucki and Kalin's theory and results
argue strongly in favor of modesty about the implications of their
current work. They also present a challenge to both defenders and
critics of the current system to produce stronger theories and better
tests to prove them. We think that such attention to the potential
defects of the current venue system are well-deserved. Indeed, de-
spite our arguments that LoPucki and Kalin's data do not prove
that traditional Chapter 11 practice in Delaware is suspect, we re-
main open to that possibility. LoPucki and Kalin have highlighted
the need to search for empirical answers to the Delawarization
question.
To finish this reply with a reminder of where we started, our
proposal to reform the existing venue selection system argues that
the current system is not working as well as it could, and that al-
lowing companies to precommit to the venue in which they will seek
reorganization, if it should become necessary, will be an improve-
ment over the existing system. Our proposal would align the eco-
nomic incentives of those making the decision with the overall wel-
fare of the firm. Theory gives us reason to believe that alignment of
managers' incentives with the goal of maximizing firm value will
nudge the venue choice toward the socially optimal one. LoPucki
and Kalin's data do not suggest otherwise.
62. LoPucki and Kalin, supra note 6 at 255 & n.57. The other "tests" on this point do not
discuss any measures of company.specific risk. See id. at 255-56.
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